

Message Text

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ORIGIN SP-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 NSC-05 NSCE-00 OES-02 PM-03

IO-03 ACDA-10 INR-05 CIAE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 RSC-01

/054 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:WGATHRIGHT:EMS

APPROVED BY ACDA:FCIKLE

NSC:DELLIOTT

OES:JGRANGER S/S-O:GTWOHIE

C:WSHINN

EUR/SOV:GHUMPHREY

PM/DCA:JKELLY

IO/UNP:VBAKER

OSD/ISA:DANDERSON

ACDA/NWT:RMIKULAK

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O 050107Z NOV 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 242829

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

TAGS: PARM, UR, US, OEXD

SUBJECT:ENMOD DISCUSSIONS

STATE ENMOD MESSAGE NUMBER THREE

DELIVER TO PIERCE CORDEN BY OPENING OF BUSINESS NOV.5

1. IN THE FINAL SESSION OF THE TALKS ON NOV. 5, THE
DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS RAISED
IN PARAS 2-5.

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2. FEDEROV'S FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE CATEGORIES INCLUDE IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCES. DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF WHAT SOVIET SIDE HAS IN MIND RESPECTING NON-NUCLEAR IONOSPHERIC DISTURBANCES HAVING WIDESPREAD, LONG-LASTING, OR SEVERE EFFECTS. DELEGATION SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT PRESENT US POLICY DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT IONOSPHERE WOULD BE COVERED BY AGREED MEASURES.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHY FEDEROV REFERRED TO QUOTE NEAR SPACE. UNQUOTE. WAS THIS TERM INTRODUCED BY THE US SIDE OR THE SOVIET SIDE? WHAT SIGNIFICANCE DO THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO TERM QUOTE NEAR SPACE UNQUOTE IN CONTRAST WITH ATMOSPHERE, IONOSPHERE, ETC?

4. RESPECTING NON-WAR SITUATIONS, SOVIET APPROACH SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY BROAD IN THAT, ACCORDING TO FEDEROV, IT WOULD COVER NOT ONLY ACTS WHICH INFLICTED DAMAGE BUT ALSO ACTS WHICH WERE QUOTE UNWANTED UNQUOTE BY OR WHICH QUOTE BOTHERED UNQUOTE OTHER STATES. DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY WHETHER SOVIETS MEAN TO LUMP TOGETHER MEASURES DEALING WITH WEAPONS USES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL APPLICATIONS HAVING CROSS- BORDER EFFECTS.

5. DELEGATION SHOULD ALSO ASK SOVIET SIDE WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND IN PROPOSING TO BAN ACTS WHICH OTHER STATES CONSIDERED QUOTE UNWANTED UNQUOTE OR QUOTE BOTHERSOME UNQUOTE. IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD ASK WHAT TYPE OF PROOF SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF A STATE SHOULD COMPLAIN THAT IT CONSIDERED CERTAIN ACTIVITIES QUOTE UNWANTED UNQUOTE OR THAT IT HAD BEEN QUOTE BOTHERED UNQUOTE BY THEM. DELEGATION SHOULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER SOVIETS SEE ANY IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR OWN PROGRAMS.

6. IN DISCUSSING QUESTION OF HOW DETAILED MEASURES SHOULD BE, DELEGATION SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER BY PRESENT US POLICY.

7. PARA 6 OF DELEGATION'S ENMOD MESSAGE TWO SUGGESTS THAT
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WE MAY HAVE GIVEN SOVIET SIDE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT WE MIGHT FAVOR BILATERAL IN CONTRAST WITH A MULTILATERAL OUTCOME. IF DELEGATION BELIEVES THIS IMPRESSION MIGHT HAVE BEEN GIVEN, OUR INTEREST IN MULTILATERAL OUTCOME SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR.

8. PARA 2 OF DELEGATION'S ENMOD MESSAGE NUMBER TWO DESCRIBES AS EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION OF LIMITS QUOTE

THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE OF SMALL-SCALE OR SHORT-TERM, OR WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE SEVERE EFFECTS UNQUOTE. IF THIS MATTER ARISES IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OR IN PREPARING JOINT WORK STATEMENT, DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ACTIVITIES EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION OF LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE ALL THREE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS CITED, THAT IS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE OF SMALL-SCALE AND OF SHORT-TERM AND HAVE NO SEVERE EFFECTS. WE WOULD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, EXCLUDE ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE OF SMALL-SCALE BUT HAD LONG-LASTING OR SEVERE EFFECTS.

9. IF PRACTICAL, DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK TO INCLUDE IN "INT WORK REPORT THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE OFFERED FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE CATEGORIES. THIS MAY BE HELPFUL LATER IN WEEDING OUT CERTAIN CATEGORIES COVERED BY THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION, WHICH THEY APPARENTLY DID NOT REGARD AS BEING OF SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PRIORITY TO CITE ILLUSTRATIVELY IN THE BILATERALS.

10. WITHOUT RAISING MATTER WITH SOVIET SIDE, DELEGATION SHOULD ADVISE US WHETHER SOVIET SIDE HAS OFFERED ANY COMMENTS ON UNGA RESOLUTION AND WHETHER FEDEROV OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPEARS TO BE SERVING AS A LINK BETWEEN THE BILATERALS AND SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE GA. INGERSOLL

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